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The Consolidated Audit Trail: An Overreaction to the
Danger of Flash Crashes from High Frequency Trading
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 6, 2010, $1 trillion of securities’ market value
dissipated in less than thirty minutes.1 The rapid decline of market
value is now known as the “Flash Crash.”2 During the Flash Crash,
some blue-chip stocks such as Proctor & Gamble lost 36% of their
value,3 while other stocks like Accenture lost 99% of their value.4 In
just twenty minutes on the afternoon of the Flash Crash, stock
exchanges processed 20,000 trades, spanning more than 300 securities,
which traded at a price 60% higher or lower than the securities’ prices
earlier that afternoon.5 High Frequency Trading (“HFT”)6 received the
majority of the blame for the extreme loss of market value.7 The Flash
Crash began when a HFT hedge fund,8 using an incorrectly inputted
Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 704 (2013).
Id.; Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U.
RICH. L. REV. 523, 527 (2014).
3. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 525.
4. Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the
SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1703 (2012).
5. Id.
6. HFT funds buy or sell securities at speeds not obtainable by humans because of the
use of algorithms that allow the HFT funds to react to market news before humans can
decide whether to buy or sell. See Matthew O’Brien, High Speed Trading Isn’t About
Efficiency—It’s About Cheating, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/02/high-speed-trading-isnt-aboutefficiency-its-about-cheating/283677/?single_page=true.
7. See REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS
OF
MAY 6, 2010, at 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf (describing how the
improper execution of a sell algorithm was a direct cause of the Flash Crash).
8. A HFT hedge fund operates much like a normal hedge fund, except its primary way
to derive income is from the use of complex algorithms that operate at speeds not attainable
by other investors. See Katherine Burton, Citadel Fund Said to Quadruple with HighFrequency Trades, BLOOMBERG (April 11, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/citadel-fund-said-to-quadruple-with-highfrequency-trades.html (explaining that Citadel LLC is a hedge fund that started as a high
frequency strategy fund).
1.
2.
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algorithm, executed a multi-billion dollar trade in mere minutes that
would normally take hours.9 The trade produced a domino effect of
HFT funds instantaneously selling large blocks of the same securities to
each other,10 resulting in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (“Dow”)
dropping 9.16% at the height of the Flash Crash.11
Similarly, during the “Black Monday” crash of October 19,
1987, the markets fell more than 20% and did not fully recover for
almost two years.12 Unlike the Black Monday crash, the markets during
the Flash Crash recovered most of the trillion-dollar loss in minutes.13
Four years later, however, investors still fear another flash crash and the
resulting harm.14 Fortunately, the Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) has promulgated regulations that provide increased
surveillance of the markets and more effective control over severe
market disruptions like the Flash Crash.15
On August 1, 2012, the SEC promulgated Rule 613 mandating
the eighteen16 Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”)17 and the

REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2.
Id. at 3.
Lin, supra note 1, at 704; Korsmo, supra note 2, at 527.
Korsmo, supra note 2, at 527.
Id.
Steven Russolillo, Flash Crash, Four Years Later, Still Haunts Wall Street, WALL
ST. J. MONEYBEAT (May 6, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/05/06/
flash-crash-four-years-later-still-haunts-wall-street/.
15. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45723 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
16. The SROs consist of the BATS BYX Exchange, BATS BZX Exchange, BOX
Options Exchange, C2 Options Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Chicago
Stock Exchange, EDGA Exchange, EDGX Exchange, International Securities Exchange,
ISE Gemini, MIAX Options Exchange, Nasdaq OMX BX, Nasdaq OMX PHLX, National
Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Arca, NYSE MKT, and the Nasdaq
Stock Market. CAT NMS Plan Participants, http://catnmsplan.com/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2015).
17. Securities industry SROs “existed before federal securities laws were enacted in
1933 and 1934” as “private sector membership organizations of securities industry
professionals.” Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry
Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 151
(2008). “They set standards of conduct for their members and disciplined errant members.”
Id. In recent history, SROs “have become integrated into the scheme of federal statutory
regulation” and the SEC now has “oversight of all their activities.” Id. They still, however,
play a role in controlling the national exchanges notwithstanding SEC oversight. See Order
Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan To Address Extraordinary
Market Volatility, 77 Fed. Reg. 33498, 33500 (June 6, 2012) (showing that the SROs
submitted the Plan that the SEC then adopted).
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

2015]

AN OVERREACTION TO FLASH CRASHES

137

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)18 to jointly submit
a National Market System (“NMS”) plan, which requires them to create
and implement a Consolidated Audit Trail (“CAT”).19 Congress
developed the NMS in 1975 in order to ensure a readily accessible,
efficient, and fair market place.20 Rule 613 aims to further the goals of
the NMS by giving regulators more effective control and surveillance of
the markets in a time of increased electronic trading.21 Rule 613 also
allows regulators to track all NMS security22 activity in an efficient and
accurate manner.23 The rule mandates that each national security
exchange and FINRA provide detailed information—including
origination, modification, cancellation, routing, and execution—on
every quote, order, and trade across all NMS exchanges.24 Every quote,
order, and trade must be reported into a central repository by the next
trading day in order for the SEC and the SROs to monitor and analyze

18. FINRA is an independent non-profit organization dedicated to investor protection
and efficient regulation of the securities industry. About FINRA, FIN. INDUSTRY REG.
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). Congress
authorized FINRA to protect investors and FINRA does so by writing and enforcing rules
governing the activities of over 4,100 securities firms with approximately 640,000 brokers.
Id. Furthermore, FINRA is a “private nonprofit funded from fees from the exchanges as
well as from the Wall Street brokerages it regulates.” Silla Brush & Matthew Phillips, An
SEC Computer to Peer into Wall Street’s Dark Pools, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., Aug. 11,
2014, at 28–29.
19. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45723.
20. See Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815,
834 (2001) (explaining that Congress developed the NMS out of a desire for efficient
execution of transactions, fair competition between exchanges and markets, readily
available quotes, the ability to execute orders in the best market, and so investors could
execute orders without the participation of a dealer).
21. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Consolidated Audit Trail
System
to
Better
Track
Market
Trades
(May
26,
2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-86.htm.
22. A NMS security is “any security or class of securities for which transaction reports
are collected, processed, and made available pursuant to an effective transaction reporting
plan, or an effective national market system plan for reporting transaction in listed options.”
17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(46) (2014). “In general the term NMS security refers to exchangelisted equity securities and standardized options, but does not include exchange-listed debt
securities, securities futures, or open-end mutual funds, which are not currently reported
pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan.” Responses to Frequently Asked
Questions Concerning Large Trader Reporting, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/large-trader-faqs.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Fact Sheet: Creating a Consolidated Audit Trail, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(July 11, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171492567#.U_Xq_
M9MvX4 (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]
24. Id.
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the markets.25
The rise of HFT and the subsequent Flash Crash also forced the
SEC to adopt additional regulations to combat flash crashes.26 These
regulations such as the limit-up-limit-down mechanism, erroneous trade
rules, market access regulations, and large trader reporting rules
substantially limit the possibility future flash crashes.27 Regardless of
the financial costs28 and immense data privacy concerns,29 the SEC
promulgated Rule 613.30 For instance, the CAT will record over 50
billion daily transactions and monitor over 100 million customer
accounts, making it the largest transaction securities database in the
world.31 On September 30, 2014, the SROs and FINRA submitted the
NMS plan,32 which estimates an average total five year cost of $255
million.33
The NMS plan provides an iteration of the CAT—while cost
friendly relative to initial estimates34—that is neither substantially
effective, nor necessary in light of previous efforts to combat flash
crashes. This Note discusses HFT, its potential dangers and effects, and
the regulations attempting to control the dangers and effects.
Additionally, the Note analyzes the CATs goals, potential problems,
and costs. Part II provides an overview of HFT, how it affects the
market landscape, and its function and goals.35 Part III examines the

Id.
See Ken Sweet, ‘Flash Crash’ Worries Go Global, CNN MONEY (May 6, 2011,
11:09 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/06/markets/flash_crash/index.htm.
27. See infra Part IV.A–D.
28. CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, 46 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 39, at 1948, 1948 (Oct. 6, 2014) (estimating the CAT to cost over $500 million
over its first five years of implementation).
29. See Yin Vilczek, SEC Adopts Rule for Consolidated Audit Trail; Dissenters Object
to Change From Proposal, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1359 (July 16, 2012)
(offering an overview of the amount of data that must be reported to the central repository of
the CAT).
30. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45723 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
31. CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, supra note 28.
32. Letter from the Parties to the National Market System Plan Governing the
Consolidated Audit Trail to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Sept. 30,
2014) [hereinafter Joint NMS Plan Letter], available at http://catnmsplan.com/web/groups
/catnms/@catnms/documents/appsupportdocs/p600989.pdf.
33. Id.
34. CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, supra note 28.
35. See infra Part II.
25.
26.
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causes and repercussions of the Flash Crash.36 Part IV analyzes SEC
regulations concerning market control, how they function, why they are
important to prevent extreme market volatility, and the effectiveness of
each regulation.37 Part V examines the purpose and need for the NMS
Plan, why the adopted iteration of the CAT is ineffective, and conflicts
of interest arising from Rule 613.38 Part VI discusses the potential costs
of the CAT, specifically the actual financial costs and potential privacy
costs.39 Lastly, Part VII summarizes why the CAT is an overreaction to
the dangers of flash crashes.40
II. UNDERSTANDING HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING
The switch from pen and paper to computer and keyboard in the
digital world produced the need for HFT.41 While the advent of HFT42
is inconclusive, some familiar with HFT suggested it originated around
1999.43 Since 1999, traders yelling out bids and asks on the trading
floor actually represent few, if any, trades.44 Instead, HFT funds make a

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use
and Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 2010).
42. A literature review released by the SEC identified five characteristics that are often
attributed to HFT:
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

1. Use of Extraordinarily high speed and sophisticated programs for
generating, routing, and executing orders.
2. Use of co-location services and individuals data feeds offered by
exchanges and others to minimize network and other latencies.
3. Very-short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions.
4. Submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after
submission.
5. Ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible.
STAFF OF THE DIV. OF TRADING AND MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EQUITY MARKET
STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW: PART II: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 4 (Mar. 18, 2014)
MARKET
STRUCTURE],
available
at
[hereinafter
EQUITY
http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf.
43. Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Trading and Its Impact on Market Quality 5
(July 6, 2010) (unpublished thesis, Northwestern University), available at
http://www.futuresindustry.org/ptg/downloads/HFT_Trading.pdf.
44. McGowan, supra note 41, ¶ 1.
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majority of trades.45 HFT funds can operate as part of a large hedge
fund with many different income streams, or funds that derive income
only from HFT.46 “HFT is one of the most significant market structure
developments in recent years” and impacts an overwhelming majority
of the market’s performance.47 Algorithmic trading48 is the heart of
HFT, and these algorithms continually evolve in both complexity and
speed.49
HFT funds differ from the average investor because they use
computers and algorithms to trade at speeds and intelligences not
attainable by humans.50 The incredible speeds at which HFT funds
trade (milliseconds or less) result in increased profits because of the
infinitesimal distortions among prices across exchanges.51 Using
computer derived algorithms, HFT funds profit by moving in and out of
positions at faster rates than the average investor.52 HFT funds can also
determine market distortions more quickly and more efficiently than the
average investor.53 For example, large mutual fund A executes a trade
to sell two million shares of Apple.54 The trade induces a momentary
dip in the price of Apple stock because the market is now saturated with
two million more shares of Apple stock.55 The HFT funds’ algorithms
instantaneously execute a trade to buy56 Apple stock during the brief
decline in price and proceed to sell it shortly thereafter at the normal
45. See EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE, supra note 42, at 4 (“While not a vast majority,
most estimates suggest that HFT contribute to at least 50% of trades executed.”).
46. Burton, supra note 8.
47. Id.
48. “A group of researchers has identified the following helpful common
characteristics of algorithmic trading as (1) the use of pre-designed trading decisions; (2)
implementation by professional traders; (3) automated observation of market data in real
time; (4) automated order submission; (5) automated order management; (6) lack of pretrade human intervention; and (7) use of direct market access (in other words, the trader’s
computer interfaces directly with the exchange’s computerized trading system).” Korsmo,
supra note 2, at 538–39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. See McGowan, supra note 41, ¶ 2.
50. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
51. Id. ¶ 15.
52. Id.
53. Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
54. See Bill Conerly, High Frequency Trading Explained Simply, FORBES (Apr. 4,
2011, 2:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2014/04/14/high-frequencytrading-explained-simply/.
55. Id.
56. HFT funds also do the inverse and short sell stocks, when they detect a stock rising
in price that will drop in price shortly thereafter. Id.
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price.57
Simply detecting the dip in stock price more quickly than the
average investor, however, does not guarantee the HFT fund will
profit.58 The HFT fund must distinguish between short blips in prices
and overall trends in the market because the former results in profits for
of
the HFT fund, while the latter may not.59 The difficulty
distinguishing between a blip and a trend requires more effective and
complex algorithms.60 Even with HFT profits declining since their peak
in 2009, HFT still constitutes a majority of trades in the United States
and, therefore, substantially impacts U.S. securities’ markets.61
III. THE FLASH CRASH OF MAY 6, 2010
The SEC blamed the Flash Crash on HFT, notwithstanding the
negative financial landscape leading up to the Flash Crash on the
morning of May 6, 2010.62 Negative political and economic news
concerning the European debt crisis loomed large,63 leading market
participants to increase their aversion to risk.64 For instance, gold
futures rose 2.5% as investors engaged in a “flight to quality.”65 Even
after acknowledging heightened conditions for market volatility,
however, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) determined, after four months of analyzing and examining
trading data from the day of the Flash Crash, that HFT substantially
caused the Flash Crash.66
The first domino falling on the day of the Flash Crash occurred
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 542.
See REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–3 (explaining the backdrop of a volatile market, yet
describing how a HFT fund’s improperly executed order led to extreme volatility).
63. Id. at 1.
64. See id. at 9.
65. Id. Because of its status as a safe investment, buying gold is considered a “flight to
quality.” See Frank Tang & Clara Denina, PRECIOUS—Gold Rises to 2-Week High as
(Oct.
9,
2014,
2:38
PM),
Equities Slide
on
Growth,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/09/markets-precious-idUSL3N0S42TN20141009
(stating that when market participants lose faith in equities they sometimes start investing
more heavily in relatively safe investments, such as gold).
66. See REPORT, supra note 7, at 2–5 (detailing how the HFT fund’s improperly
inputted algorithm started a chain reaction which lead to the substantial market loss).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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when a HFT fund in Kansas (“Waddell & Reed”)67 initiated a trade to
sell 75,000 E-Mini68 contracts, valued at $4.1 billion.69 Waddell &
Reed designed the trade to execute sell orders of June 2010 E-Mini
contracts until it reached a pre-calculated point of volume.70 Waddell &
Reed, however, neglected to program the algorithm to include price or
time as part of the inputs.71 Because of the improper inputs, the
algorithm executed the trade in only twenty minutes, whereas a
comparable trade of similar size normally takes days to execute.72 By
comparison, Waddell & Reed previously placed an identical-sized order
that took over five hours to execute because the algorithm included time
and price as inputs.73
Shortly after Waddell & Reed executed the trade, other HFT
funds reacted by buying E-Mini futures because their algorithms
predicted E-Mini futures returning to normal levels.74 As other HFT
funds commenced trading E-Mini futures, however, Waddell & Reed’s
faulty algorithm proceeded to fill its original order even faster because
of the increased volume, without regard to price. 75 A combination of
the pressure from Waddell & Reed’s algorithm and other HFT funds
reacting to Waddell & Reed’s trading resulted in the price of E-Mini
futures declining by 3% in four minutes.76 Shortly thereafter, the HFT
funds rapidly bought and then resold contracts among each other,
resulting in the same position passing back and forth.77
The Dow had not witnessed such volatility and loss of value in

67. Marcy Gordon & Daniel Wagner, ‘Flash Crash Report: Waddell & Reed Blamed
for Market Plunge’, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (Dec. 1, 2010, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/01/flash-crash-report-one-41_n_747215.html.
68. The E-Mini is “designed to track stocks in the S&P 500 Index.” REPORT, supra
note 7, at 10; see Korsmo, supra note 2, at 568 n. 219 (“The holder of an E-Mini contract is
entitled to a payment of 50 times the value of the S&P 500 index at the time the contract
expires. The E-Mini is one of the most widely traded stock market index futures contract,
allowing both speculation and hedging of other positions.”).
69. REPORT, supra note 7, at 2; Lin, supra note 1, at 704.
70. REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Lin, supra note 1, at 704.
75. REPORT, supra note 7, at 3–4.
76. Id. at 15.
77. See id. at 3 (stating that in twelve seconds HFT funds traded over 27,000 contracts,
49% of the total volume, but only bought an additional 200 contracts).
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such a short period of time since Black Monday78 in 1987.79 Many of
the other 8,000 individual equity securities and exchange traded funds
(“ETFs”)80 suffered price declines of up to 15%, but recovered most of
their loss by the end of the trading day.81 Some stocks traded for a
penny or less and then quickly returned to their pre-crash levels.82
Stocks such as Apple and Sothebys traded at $100,000, when they
opened the day around $25083 and $34,84 respectively, only to return to
opening day prices shortly thereafter.85 In whole, $1 trillion worth of
securities’ market value dissipated in thirty minutes. 86
Days of extreme volatility similar to the Flash Crash must be
avoided because they detrimentally impact investors’ confidence in the
market.87 Equity markets were envisioned as a place where individual
investors could use their capital to invest in growing companies.88
Individual investment also lowers the cost of capital for companies and
increase the rate of return for investors, thereby benefiting both
investors and companies.89 The ability of one HFT fund to commence a
string of actions pushing a $30 stock to a penny, however, gives the
individual investor “little incentive to risk their capital.”90
78. Financial analysts determined that commodity futures trading was the leading
precipitating factor of the market crash in 1987. See Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy
Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987—The United States Looks at New
Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 1998–99 (1988). Specifically, the use of futures to
hedge, resulting in pseudo “portfolio insurance”, was cited as a reason for the crash. Id.
79. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 526.
80. ETF’s are similar to mutual funds in that they are both pools of investments, but
while an ETF’s price changes throughout the trading day, a mutual fund’s price is set at the
end of each trading day. Michael Chamberlain, What’s the Difference? Mutual Funds and
Exchange Traded Funds Explained, FORBES (July 18, 2013, 12:20 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/feeonlyplanner/2013/07/18/whats-the-difference-mutual-fundsand-exchange-traded-funds-explained/. For example, during trading days an ETF has a
continuous bid and ask price, while the price of the mutual fund for the trading day is the
price determined at the end of the previous trading day. Id. Furthermore, the operating
expenses of ETFs are less than a mutual fund, and they are treated different for tax purposes.
Id.
81. REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
82. Id.
83. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 527.
84. Lin, supra note 1, at 704.
85. Id.; see Korsmo, supra note 2, at 526–27.
86. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 526.
87. Andrew J. Keller, Robocops: Regulating High Frequency Trading After the Flash
Crash of 2010, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1476 (2012).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1474.
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IV. REGULATIONS PROMULGATED IN RESPONSE TO THE FLASH CRASH
In order to prevent another Flash Crash, the SEC responded with
regulations addressing market volatility mechanisms, clearly erroneous
trade protection, risk management for broker-dealers, and large trader
SEC
reporting requirements.91 All of the regulations that the
promulgated work in conjunction with each other to more thoroughly
and effectively regulate the market to prevent flash crashes.92
Additionally, even the large trader reporting requirement, rendered
somewhat redundant by the CAT, continues to exist after the
implementation of the CAT.93 If the regulations prove as effective as
intended, however, the need for the CAT to help prevent flash crashes
becomes considerably diminished.
A.

Market Volatility Mechanisms: Market-Wide Circuit Breakers,
Single-Stock Circuit Breakers, and Limit Up-Limit Down
Mechanism

On June 10, 2010, barely a month after the Flash Crash, the SEC
approved new rules on a pilot basis94 that expanded circuit breaker
regulations.95 Market circuit breakers pause all trading activity if the
“benchmark index”96 that the circuit breakers are tied to decreases to a
set percentage relative to the previous trading day.97 The New York
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) instituted market circuit breakers in October

Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
See id.
Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45733–34 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
94. The U.S. exchanges and FINRA proposed the rules in response to the Flash Crash.
See Investor Bulletin: New Stock by Stock Circuit Breakers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/circuitbreakers.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) [hereinafter
Investor Bulletin].
95. Id.
96. The Dow was the benchmark index for the original market circuit breakers. NYSE
Market Model: Circuit Breakers, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/market-model
(last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
97. Testimony Concerning the Severe Market Disruption on May 6, 2010, Before the
H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., 111th Cong. 11–12 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro Testimony]
(statement of Mary L. Shapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (stating that at its lowest
decline from the previous day close the Dow had declined 9.16%, which was not enough to
trigger the 10% market circuit breakers).
91.
92.
93.
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1989, following the Black Monday98 crash in October 1987, in order to
“reduce volatility and promote investor confidence.”99 The pause in
trading offers an investor time to decipher information surrounding the
decline, and make informed decisions regarding high market
volatility.100 The NYSE last updated the original market circuit
breakers in 1998.101 The original market circuit breakers paused trading
for a set duration if the Dow declined 10%, 20%, or 30%, compared to
the previous close of the Dow.102 These market circuit breakers were in
effect during the Flash Crash, but failed to trigger because the Dow did
not fall below the 10% threshold.103 In response to the Flash Crash not
triggering the existing market circuit breakers, the SEC moved swiftly
to approve rules to expand the circuit breaker program.104
Citing “disparate trading rules and conventions across the
exchanges,” as a basis for the Flash Crash, then SEC Chairwoman Mary
Shapiro deemed uniform circuit breakers of great importance to combat
future times of high market volatility.105 Shapiro explained that “[single
stock circuit breakers] across exchanges would limit volatility” and
would “increase market transparency, [and] bolster investor
protection.”106 The new single stock circuit breaker rules instituted a
“uniform market-wide pause in trading in individual stocks whose price
moves 10% or more in a five-minute period.”107 The five-minute pause
gives the markets an opportunity to “establish a reasonable market
price[]” and “resume trading in a fair and orderly fashion.”108 The SEC
implemented single stock circuit breakers in three phases, culminating
in all NMS securities being subjected to single stock circuit breaker
98. On October 19, 1987, the market fell 22.6% and lost $500 billion in one day. Mark
Koba, Market Circuit Breakers: CNBC Explains, CNBC.COM (Aug. 10, 2011),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/44059883#.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Shapiro Testimony, supra note 97, at 11.
102. Id. at 1.
103. Id. at 2.
104. See Investor Bulletin, supra note 94.
105. Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC to Publish for Public Comment
Stock-by
Stock
Circuit
Breaker
Rule
Proposals
(June
30,
2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-117.htm.
106. Id.
107. See Investor Bulletin, supra note 94.
108. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Rules Expanding Stockby Stock Circuit Breakers and Clarifying Process for Breaking Erroneous Trades (Sept. 10,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-167.htm.
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rules.109 While swift action was taken after the Flash Crash, the SEC
only applied single stock circuit breaker rules on a pilot basis and
ultimately replaced them in 2012 when the SEC adopted new proposals
to curb market volatility.110
On May 31, 2012, the SEC adopted two proposals, overhauling
how exchanges dealt with flash crashes.111 The first proposal updated
market wide circuit breakers.112 The second proposal, the “limit uplimit-down” mechanism, replaced the existing single stock circuit
breakers that expired on July 31, 2012.113 The new market wide circuit
breaker rules decreased the thresholds that trigger a trading pause to
7%, 13%, and 20% from 10%, 20%, and 30%, respectively.114
Additionally, the SEC will calculate the triggering values daily, and the
S&P 500 replaced the Dow as the reference index used to calculate the
trigger points of a trading halt.115
The second proposal established a limit up-limit down
mechanism.116 The limit up-limit down mechanism “intend[s] to reduce
the negative impacts of sudden unanticipated price movements” similar
to those that happened during the Flash Crash.117 The mechanism
establishes price bands,118 and if an individual NMS stock moves
outside of its price band for more than fifteen seconds, the exchanges
pause trading on the stock for five minutes.119 The plan established
different tiers of securities resulting in different price bands for different
109.
See Investor Bulletin, supra note 94 (providing that phase one subjected stocks
listed on the S&P 500 to the rules, phase two subjected securities listed on the Russell 2000
and Exchange Traded funds to the rules, and phase three subjected all NMS securities to the
rules).
110. See Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 108.
111. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Proposals to Address
Extraordinary Volatility in Individual Stocks and Broader Stock Market (June 1, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171482422#.VNBTO4fxT
FI.
112. Id.
113. Order Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan To Address
Extraordinary Market Volatility 77 Fed. Reg. 33498, 33500 (June 6, 2012).
114. Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 111.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Order Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan To Address
Extraordinary Market Volatility, 77 Fed. Reg. at 33501.
118. The upper and lower price bands are based on a reference price which is the mean
price of reported transactions for the NMS stock over the preceding five minute period. Id.
119. Order Approving, on a Pilot Basis, the National Market System Plan To Address
Extraordinary Market Volatility, 77 Fed. Reg. at 33501.
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securities.120 For example, Tier 1 NMS securities—securities in the
S&P 500 Index, Russell 1000 Index, and certain ETFs—with a price of
more than $3 use a 5% percentage parameter, instead of the previous
10% parameter.121 Tier 2122 NMS Stocks with a price greater than $3
use a 10% percentage parameter, instead of the previous 20%
parameter.123
B.

Clearly Erroneous Trades

On September 16, 2010, the SEC adopted new rules regulating
clearly erroneous trades.124 During a twenty minute period on the day
of the Flash Crash, exchanges processed many trades, in different
securities, at prices differing 60% from their pre-Flash Crash level.125
The National Security Exchanges, along with FINRA, invalidated all
trades executed at levels 60% or more away from preceding levels
under their erroneous trade execution authority.126 This erroneous trade
authority, however, could only be authorized during extraordinary
market conditions.127
Yet, the exchanges did not have uniform rules on precisely how
to determine if the trades were erroneous.128 Some exchanges designate
erroneous trades by calculating if the price of a stock exceeded a
parameter percentage based on the preceding market price, while other
exchanges give power to their officials to label trades erroneous.129 The
lack of transparency in determining the 60% figure to break trades could
lead to confusion and uncertainty during a flash crash.130 As a result,
the SEC adopted uniform guidelines on breaking erroneous trades.131
The new rules on breaking erroneous trades provide a uniform
120. Id.
121. Id. at 33514–15.
122. All stocks that are not Tier 1 NMS stocks. Id.
123. Id.
124. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Clearly Erroneous

Transactions, 75 Fed. Reg. 56613 (Sept. 16, 2010).
125. REPORT supra note 7, at 1.
126. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Clearly Erroneous
Transactions, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56614.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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standard that reduces investor uncertainty about the determinations of
erroneous trades.132 Then SEC Chairwoman Shapiro stated, “Adopting
consistent standards . . . will strengthen the resiliency of our markets . . .
especially during periods of high market volatility.”133 The clearly
erroneous trade rules vest power in the exchange to break a trade if the
price exceeded the consolidated last sale price by more than a specified
percentage amount.134 Stocks priced under twenty-five dollars must
deviate at least 10% in order to be considered broken by exchanges.135
Stocks priced between twenty-five and fifty dollars must deviate at least
5%, while stocks priced over fifty dollars must deviate at least 3%.136
Further, erroneous trade review must commence within thirty minutes
of the erroneous trade, and be resolved within thirty minutes of the start
of the review.137
C.

Risk Management for Broker-Dealers with Market Access

Because HFT compounds the impact of trading error, stringent
pre-trade risk controls are necessary.138
Moreover, the
interconnectedness of the majority of financial markets allows trading
errors to influence the whole market landscape.139 On November 15,
2010, the SEC adopted rules prohibiting broker-dealers from granting
“naked access” to an exchange and placing risk management controls
on direct access given to customers.140
HFT funds with naked access submit orders directly to an
exchange, bypassing the broker-dealer’s trading system.141 Bypassing a
broker-dealer’s trading system benefits HFT funds because it saves time
and allows for “reduced latencies, and can facilitate more rapid
trading.”142 An HFT fund, using naked access without its own of risk
Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 105.
Id.
Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Clearly Erroneous
Transactions, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56614–15.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers With Market Access, 75 Fed.
Reg. 69792 (Nov. 15, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 240).
139. Id. at 69794.
140. Id. at 69792–93.
141. Id. at 69822.
142. Id. at 69793.
132.
133.
134.
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control, can submit orders to an exchange without review for mistakes
or miscalculations.143 Shapiro likened “naked access” to “giving your
car keys to a friend who doesn’t have a license and letting him drive
unaccompanied.”144
Direct access orders do not bypass the broker-dealer’s trading
system. However, before direct access regulation, the SEC had not
implemented uniform risk control rules for broker-dealers.145 For
instance, some broker-dealers provided direct access without sufficient
pre-trade risk resulting in the broker dealers offering HFT funds, in
essence, naked access.146 The adopted rule decreases the likelihood of
broker-dealers executing faulty orders by instituting uniform risk
control rules.147
Prohibiting naked access and putting risk controls on brokerdealers substantially diminishes the risks of an improperly executed
order resulting in another flash crash.148 For example, assume a buy
algorithm placed orders at a rate of 1,000 per second and mistakenly
placed repetitive 300-share orders, instead of one single 300-share order
at a price of $20 per share.149 A two-minute delay in unearthing the
improperly executed algorithm would allow the algorithm to execute
120,000 orders valued at $720 million instead of one order valued at
$6,000.150 However, the prohibition on “naked access” and institution
of pre-trade risk controls, together, prevent this outcome by blocking
the unintended orders from reaching the exchange.151

143. Id. at 69794.
144. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts New Rule Preventing

Unfiltered Market Access (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010210.htm.
145. See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75
Fed. Reg. at 69794.
146. Id.
147. See id. (“For example, a system-driven pre-trade control designed to reject orders
that are not reasonably related to the quoted price of the security would prevent erroneously
entered orders from reaching the securities markets . . . .”).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. If 1,000 orders were placed every second, 120,000 orders could be placed in
two minutes. Further, 120,000 orders consisting of 300 shares would result in 36 million
shares purchased; 36 million shares valued at $20 dollars share would be valued at $720
million.
151. Id.

150
D.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 19

Large Trader Reporting

On August 3, 2011, the SEC adopted a large trader reporting
rule requiring traders of a certain size to report trading data to the
SEC.152 While the SEC proposed the rule before the Flash Crash, the
Flash Crash re-emphasized the importance of the SEC adopting a rule to
“gather[] data on the most active market participants.”153 There are two
separate ways a trader qualifies as large trader.154 First, a trader with an
activity level greater than or equal to 2 million shares or any number of
shares with a fair market value of $20 million or greater on any calendar
day qualifies as a large trader.155 Second, a trader with an activity level
greater than or equal to twenty million shares or any number of shares
with a fair market value of $200 million or greater during any calendar
month qualifies as large trader.156
By attaching a unique identification number to each large trader,
the rule “allow[s] the [SEC] to efficiently identify and analyze trading
activity by the large trader.”157 Furthermore, large traders must provide
transaction data—including every order, cancellation of an order, and
modification of an order—on every transaction made on the morning
after the transaction.158
The large trader reporting rule provides the SEC with
heightened oversight into the actions of large traders.159 The rule also
allows the SEC to “reconstruct market events, conduct investigations,
and [execute] enforcement actions as appropriate.”160 Because the CAT
requires the same data as the large trader reporting rule from all brokerdealers, some members of the industry suggest the large trader reporting
rule will become somewhat redundant when the CAT becomes fully
effective.161 Because the SEC believes the rule will complement the
152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13h-1 (2014).
153. Large Trader Reporting, 76 Fed. Reg. 46960 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R.

pts. 240 & 249).
154. Id. at 46966 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.13h-1(a)(7) (2014)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Large Trader Reporting
Regime (July 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-154.htm.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting then Chairwoman Shapiro).
161. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45723 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
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CAT and understands how long the SROs will need to fully implement
the CAT, the SEC will not invalidate the rule.162
E.

Effectiveness of the Regulations

Ultimately, no extreme market volatility followed the Flash
Crash.163 Industry experts, however, differ on whether the new
regulations provided this long term stability.164 For instance, a trader at
Themis Trading suggested that a flash crash could happen at any time
irrespective of the regulations.165 Conversely, a spokesman from BATS
exchange opined that the mechanisms in place make a flash crash “far
less likely.”166 Therefore, conclusively determining the effectiveness of
these regulations is a difficult task because the exact set of
circumstances present on May 6, 2010, are unlikely to repeat.167 It is
possible, however, to look at the regulations individually to evaluate
how each would have impacted the Flash Crash.
First, during the height of the Flash Crash, the S&P 500’s
decline of 8.6%168 was insufficient to trigger the previous market circuit
breakers.169 The new post-Flash Crash market wide circuit breakers,
however, pause trading at a 7% decline in the S&P 500.170 Therefore,
the 8.6% decline would have resulted in a market wide trading pause.171
The trading pause would have allowed investors the time to make
informed decisions about market conditions, thereby reducing market

162.
163.

See id. at 45723–24.
Matt Krantz, Four-year Flash Crash Anniversary Haunts Markets, USA TODAY
MONEY (May 5, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://americasmarkets.usatoday.com/2014/05/05/fouryear-flash-crash-anniversary-haunts-markets/.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Edgar Ortega Barrales, Note, Lessons From the Flash Crash for the Regulation
of High-Frequency Traders, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1195, 1232–34 (2012)
(indicating circumstances such as the Greece debt crisis also hovered over the stock market
during the Flash Crash).
168. Matt Jarzemsky & Michael Driscoll, New Circuit Breakers Would Have Halted
Flash Crash,
WALL
ST.
J.
BLOG
(June
1,
2012,
5:27
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/06/01/new-circuit-breakers-would-have-halted-flashcrash.
169. The Dow did not fall the requisite 10% needed to halt trading. See supra notes 94–
123 and accompanying text.
170. Jarzemsky & Driscoll, supra note 168.
171. Id.
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volatility.172
Second, a study conducted by Yale researchers concluded that
the limit up-limit down mechanism would have “adeptly halt[ed] stocks
displaying up-down volatility,” if in place during the Flash Crash.173
The study showed that the limit up-limit down mechanism would have
paused trading in 60% of the 143 Russell 1000 stocks that experienced
the
price changes beyond the 5% parameter.174 Furthermore,
mechanism would have halted 80% of the tier 2 stocks—those not listed
on the Russell 1000—that traded outside of the designated
parameters.175 For example, the limit up-limit down mechanism would
have paused Apple trading because its price fell 60% between 2:40 p.m.
and 3:00 p.m.176 Overall, the limit up-limit down mechanism is
effective, and would have limited the effects of the Flash Crash.
Third, while clearly erroneous trade regulation cannot directly
prevent a flash crash, it can decrease the effects of a flash crash.177 The
regulations pertaining to clearly erroneous trades hope to boost investor
confidence in the market during times of extreme market volatility, such
as the Flash Crash.178 While investor confidence proves difficult to
measure, industry sentiment suggests the regulation does boost investor
confidence.179
Fourth, the regulation on direct access focused substantially on
preventing HFT funds from executing erroneous orders.180 A HFT fund
using an algorithm designed with incorrect inputs substantially caused
the Flash Crash.181 Because the direct access regulation provides
safeguards on how HFT funds execute orders,182 it undoubtedly
decreases the rate of improperly executed orders reaching an
NYSE Market Model: Circuit Breakers, supra note 96.
Bill Alpert & Lisa Stryjewski, Hitting the Switch on New Circuit Breakers,
BARRON’S (Aug. 13, 2011), http://online.barrons.com/news/articles/SB500014240527
02304718904576486604254916420.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Korsmo, supra note 2, at 528.
177. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Clearly
Erroneous Transactions, 75 Fed. Reg. 56613, 56614 (Sept. 16, 2010).
178. Id.
179. Alpert & Stryjewski, supra note 173.
180. Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75 Fed.
Reg. 69792, 69794 (Nov. 15, 2010).
181. REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
182. See id.
172.
173.
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exchange.183 After the direct access regulation, a HFT fund must send
an order to a broker-dealer with risk controls before the order reaches an
exchange.184 The broker-dealer’s risk control could unearth the mistake
in the algorithm and prevent a flash crash.185
Fifth, the large trader reporting rule creates a more transparent
market.186 The large trader reporting rule provides the SEC enhanced
surveillance on the most active participants who are those able to most
substantially affect the market.187 The rule’s lack of real time reporting
limits the effectiveness in preventing a flash crash, yet effective
surveillance over large traders leads to safer investment practices188 by
giving the SEC more effective methods to detect illegal and deceptive
action.189 On the whole, the regulations promulgated after the Flash
Crash would have positive effects on either preventing the Flash Crash
or limiting the Flash Crash once started. These regulations may also
have successfully prevented many flash crashes since their enactment.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM PLAN TO CREATE A
CONSOLIDATED AUDIT TRAIL
The SEC adopted Rule 613 to allow the SEC to efficiently and
accurately track all activity throughout the U.S. markets in NMS
securities.190 The process of analyzing market events surrounding the
Flash Crash lasted over four months.191 The non-existence of any
comprehensive audit trail contributed heavily to the slow process of
analyzing the few hours of trading during the Flash Crash.192 Before the
183.
See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, 75
Fed. Reg. at 69794 (describing how the risk control could prevent an improper order).
184. Id.
185. See id. (describing how the risk control could find mistakes in orders).
186. Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 157.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves New Rule Requiring
Consolidated Audit Trail to Monitor and Analyze Trading Activity (July 11, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171483188#.VMmvPM9
MvX4.
191. See Nina Mehta, Exchanges to Ask SEC to Delay Audit-Trail Deadline,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Dec. 3, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2012-12-04/exchanges-to-ask-sec-to-delay-deadline-for-audit-trail-program.
192. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45723 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
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implementation of Rule 613, the SROs and the SEC used a variety of
data sources to “fulfill their regulatory obligation.”193 For example,
FINRA members follow the Order Audit Trail System194 (“OATS”)
rules and must record any “modification, cancellation or execution” of
an order following transmission of the order to another FINRA
member.195 Other exchanges, such as options exchanges use the
Consolidated Options Audit Trail System.196
The lack of a comprehensive audit trail, many different trading
venues, and an immense amount of orders make it difficult for the SEC
to oversee the U.S. securities markets.197 Additionally, HFT, along with
the Flash Crash, increased the urgency to enact Rule 613.198
Understanding Rule 613 requires an understanding of the goals and
purposes that the NMS plan seeks to achieve through the CAT.
While Rule 613 has several goals,199 this Note specifically
examines the goal of improved market surveillance and
investigations.200 Improved market surveillance and investigation
deceases the chances of a flash crash by preventing the trades that
precipitate a flash crash.201 The CAT achieves these goals by requiring
account holders to each have a unique ID, tracking the key events of an
order, requiring comprehensive reporting of orders, and making all
NMS securities subject to the CAT.202 The goals, however, could be
thwarted by the conflicts of interest Rule 613 creates.
193.
194.

Id. at 45726.
FINRA describes OATS as an “integrated audit trail of order, quote, and trade
information for all NMS stocks and OTC equity securities.” Order Audit Trail System
(OATS), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/OATS/
index.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). “FINRA uses this audit trail system to recreate events
in the life cycle of orders and more completely monitor the trading practices of member
firms.” Id.
195. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45723.
196. Id. at 45728.
197. Id. at 45726.
198. Herbert Lash, Plan for U.S. Securities Audit Trail Seen Delayed Again, REUTERS
(Sept. 26, 2014, 5:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/26/us-sec-flashcrashdelay-idUSKCN0HL27X20140926.
199. Including analysis and reconstruction of the market during broad based events and
general market analysis. Consolidated Audit Trail 77 Fed. Reg. at 45723.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 45723–24 (holding that the CAT will allow regulators to accurately track
all activity in NMS securities). The trade that precipitated the Flash Crash was of an NMS
security and, therefore, the CAT would contain data of the trade. See Investor Bulletin,
supra note 94 (explaining that ETFs are NMS securities).
202. Id. at 45723–24.
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Need and Objectives of the CAT to Achieve the Goals of the
NMS

In order to achieve the congressional goals203 of the NMS, the
SEC and SROs need the ability to detect occurrences that threaten
market integrity and efficiency.204 The recent advances in technology,
and HFT comprising a majority of securities trades left the SEC and the
exchanges in a challenging regulatory situation.205 The NMS plan via
the CAT seeks to accomplish the goals of the NMS in the everadvancing technological world.206
The CAT improves market surveillance and investigations by
first and foremost expanding the amount of data accessible to regulators
by housing all trading data in the CAT repository and reducing the
length of time necessary to retrieve the data.207 Currently regulators
must request data from the broker-dealer, determine what format and
definitions of the data the broker-dealer uses, and then analyze the data
to determine if there is risk.208 Because the CAT utilizes a repository,
instantly accessible to regulators, that will contain all NMS security
order data, regulators no longer need to contact broker-dealers to
receive order data.209 Furthermore, the NMS plan placing restraints on
data format leads to quicker, more efficient, and more precise risk
analysis.210
On the other hand, the final rule contains a prohibition on the
NMS plan from “mandating reporting audit trail data prior to 8:00 a.m.
the next trading day.”211 The proposed rule, however, required an
iteration of the CAT encompassing real time data.212 Disregarding the
economic feasibility of real time data, the comment phase of the
proposal suggested ways to produce a timelier and more accurate CAT
See supra Part I.
Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45727 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
205. Consolidated Audit Trail, 75 Fed. Reg. at 45722.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 45723-24.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 45724.
210. See id.
211. See Elisse B. Walter, The Final Rules for Consolidated Audit Trail, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 27, 2012, 9:12 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/27/the-final-rules-for-consolidated-audit-trail/
212. Vilczek, supra note 29.
203.
204.
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rather than waiting until 8:00 a.m. the next day.213 Nevertheless, the
final rule precludes the SROs and FINRA from exploring this option.214
The CAT also improves market surveillance by requiring each account
holder to have a unique ID.215 Without the CAT, determining who
made a trade and at what time is a cumbersome process for the
SEC.216 Current SRO audit trail data only identifies the “dates and
times of trades by a particular broker-dealer,” not the identities of the
customers who used the broker-dealer and executed the actual trades.217
In order for regulators to identify the actual customers, the regulators
must receive Electronic Blue Sheet218 (“EBS”) data and compare it to a
SRO’s currently existing audit trail data, such as data compiled by
FINRA through OATS.219 To identify the time the actual trade
originated requires the regulators to obtain a third and separate set of
data.220 The third set of data becomes convoluted if single customers
use many different brokers, potentially taking months to resolve.221
Regulators, therefore, often bypass determining important details of the
order to the detriment of policing schemes that cause extreme market
volatility.222
Some critics, however, opine that Rule 613 developed trader
identification standards to lax to achieve the requisite oversight to
control market volatility and police the markets.223 For instance, the
original proposal required unique customer identifiers, whereas the final
rule only requires the identification of the account holder.224 In some
cases, the account holder ID only shows the entity on the account,
instead of the individuals making the trades.225 The adopted iteration of
Id.
Id.
Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45772 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 45731.
218. “EBSs are trading records requested by the Commission and SROs from brokerdealers that are used in regulatory investigations to identify buyers and sellers of specific
securities.” Id. at 45722.
219. Id. at 45726–28.
220. Id. at 45730.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Walter, supra note 211.
224. See id.
225. Id.
213.
214.
215.
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the CAT limits its ability to prevent future flash crashes by not requiring
real time reporting and unique customer IDs.
B.

Conflicts in the NMS Plan

The SEC pushed back the deadline to submit the NMS Plan to
September 30, 2014,226 well over a year from the original deadline.227
The SROs and FINRA pushed for extensions because of the required
“significant work and analysis.”228 Further, members of the industry
also campaigned on behalf of the SROs for an extension.229 The
industry members’ reasoning centers around data security concern and
the plan requiring a brand new reporting system, instead of updating an
existing audit trail like OATS.230
The SEC tasking the SROs (along with FINRA) with choosing
the developer of the CAT and designing the implementation of the CAT
could also lead to a delay.231 Because Rule 613 forces the SROs to fund
the running and implementation of the CAT,232 delaying the CAT would
save SROs money in the short term. The SROs, however, have the
ability to pass the costs of implementing the CAT on to brokerdealers.233 The SROs met the September 30, 2014, deadline for
submitting the NMS plan,234 yet the SROs still have not selected a
bidder to develop and implement the CAT.235 Additionally, financial
experts estimate that the implementation process of the CAT, once a
226. CAT NMS PLAN, SUMMARY OF THE CONSOLIDATED AUDIT TRAIL INITIATIVE 10
(Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://catnmsplan.com/web/groups/catnms/@catnms/
documents/appsupportdocs/p571933.pdf.
227. The Rule required the joint plan to be submitted 270 days from the publishing of
the rule in the Federal Register in August 2012. Press Release, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
supra note 190.
228. Nina Mehta, supra note 191.
229. Comment Letter from Andrew Small, General Counsel, Scottrade Inc., to U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 9, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1110/s71110-43.pdf.
230. Id.
231. Dennis Kelleher, president of Better Markets, stated “It’s not exactly in their
(SROs) interest to be quick about this.” Brush & Phillips, supra note 18.
232. Joint NMS Plan Letter, supra note 32.
233. Id.
234. See Joint NMS Plan Letter, supra note 32, at 1 (explaining that the SROs were
required to file a joint NMS plan).
235. Herbert Lash, Bidders for U.S. Market Surveillance System Make Presentations,
REUTERS (May 13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/13/sec-cat-shortlistidUSL1N0NZ2BU20140513.
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bidder is accepted, will take three years.236 Because of the two delays
and the final bidder to develop the CAT not being selected (it has been
narrowed to six bidders),237 2018 would be the CAT’s earliest
operational timeframe. 238
An additional complication is the inherent conflict of interest
between FINRA and the implementation of the CAT.239 Rule 613
dictates that FINRA and the SROs must select the bidder to implement
the CAT plan, yet FINRA also submitted a bid.240 FINRA, however,
maintains it created a wall between the employees who are helping
select the bidder and the employees working on FINRA’s individual
bid.241 FINRA operating OATS also creates a conflict because the CAT
most likely renders OATS useless.242 Additionally, some commentators
believe FINRA could lose the power and sway it holds over market data
if FINRA lost the bid.243 FINRA refutes this argument, insisting that its
survival in no way depends on winning the CAT contract.244 Conflict or
not, members of the industry opined that using a variation of OATS
provides the most efficient and effective manner to implement the
CAT.245
VI. COSTS OF THE CAT
Industry sentiment during the comment phase of Rule 613
suggested two underlying issues: (1) privacy concerning the data the
CAT collects in the repository, and (2) financial costs of implementing
the CAT.246 The privacy concerns center around the sheer volume of
data the CAT will possess, specifically identification of the account
CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, supra note 28.
Lash, supra note 235.
Brush & Phillips, supra note 18.
Lash, supra note 235.
Id.
Brush & Phillips, supra note 18.
Id.
See id.
Id. (statement of Tom Gira, Executive Vice President for Market Regulation) (“
‘[FINRA] would be disappointed [if they lost the bid], but [it would not be] the end of the
world.’ ”).
245. See Comment Letter from Howard Meyerson, General Counsel, and Vlad
Khandros, Market Structure and Public Policy Analyst, Liquidnet, New York, to U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n 1 (July 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1110/s71110-19.pdf.
246. See Small, supra note 229, at 2; Meyerson & Khandros, supra note 245, at 4.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
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holder making the trade.247 In some instances personally identifiable
information, such as social security numbers or tax ID numbers, identify
the account holder.248 While the number of account holders is not
conclusively known, account holder IDs could number over 100
million.249 The adopted version of Rule 613 eased some cost concerns
because it does not require real time (same day) reporting or unique
customer identification.250 Nevertheless, the SROs’ implementation
costs and broker-dealers’ costs to adhere to Rule 613 are immense.251
A.

Privacy Concerns

Rule 613 requires the CAT repository to house extraordinary
amounts of data concerning traders.252 The CAT repository also
inherently contains confidential data, such as market participants’
trading strategies and, therefore, security of the data is important.253
While it may be difficult to place a monetary value on this information,
institutions fear misuse of the data or adverse entities acquiring the
sensitive data.254 The benefits of the CAT could be outweighed if Rule
613 does not effectively regulate the privacy of the reported data.
For example, on January 2, 2015, the NYSE Group—a
combination of NYSE and NYSE Arca—jointly recorded 3.9 million
trades, the lowest number of trades recorded in 2015.255 Using 3.9
million as the average daily volume, extrapolated for the entire year,
results in a yearly trade volume equaling 975 million.256 Each trade
247. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45756 n.357 (Aug. 1, 2012)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
248. Id.
249. See id. The commenter suggested that the number of unique customer IDs could be
in the billions. Id. However, because the adopted version of Rule 613 only requires account
holder IDs this figure would be less than unique customer IDs. Walter, supra note 210.
Conservatively estimating that account holder IDs represent only 10% of customer IDs
would still allow the number of account holder IDs to be over 100 million. Id.
250. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45766.
251. CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, supra note 28.
252. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45766 (providing FINRA provides
40 billion data validations itself through its OATS data).
253. Id. at 45782.
254. See Small, supra note 229.
255. Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed, 2014, NYXDATA.COM,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3141
&category=3 (last updated Jan. 30th, 2015).
256. The NYSE is open five days a week, fifty-two weeks a year. Holiday and Trading
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necessitates a buyer and seller purchasing and selling a security at a
price, and Rule 613 dictates both that both require a unique account
holder ID.257 The CAT repository contains the unique account holder
ID for the entities who made the trade, the date of the trade, what
security was traded, and the price of the trade.258 The 975 million trades
that this hypothetical exhibits, however, highlight the amount of trades
from only two of the eighteen259 national securities exchanges.
Rule 613 also stipulates that the CAT must track every order
and quote made on a NMS security, regardless of whether the order is
executed.260 While every trade must have an accompanying order, some
orders go unexecuted, thereby increasing the amount of data the CAT is
required to house.261 Furthermore, the CEO from Boston Options
Exchange stated they received “millions of quotes per day.”262 In sum,
the amount of data the CAT will collect could be ten terabytes each
day.263 The ten terabytes of data include countless trading strategies of
many sophisticated investors.264 In order for Rule 613 to be justifiable,
the CAT must effectively secure the data it contains.265
Rule 613 addresses privacy concerns by mandating the NMS
Plan to adhere to certain standards.266 Specifically, Rule 613 requires
“[a]ll plan sponsors and their employees, as well as all employees of the
central repository, [to] agree to use appropriate safeguards to ensure the
confidentiality of such data and [to] agree not to use such data for any

Hours, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/markets/hours-calendars (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
Based on the market calendar and the average daily trading volume, there are approximately
975 million trades per year. See id.
257. See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45740 n.187 (observing that the
unique customer ID is necessary for an efficient CAT).
258. Id. at 45723.
259. Id.
260. Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
261. See
Limit
Orders,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/limit.htm (last visited Jan 7, 2015) (explaining that limit orders
are not necessarily executed).
262. Comment Letter from Anthony D. McCormick, CEO Boston Options Exch., to
U.S.
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n
3
(Aug.
9,
2010),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-10/s71110-38.pdf.
263. Comment Letter from Richard A. Ross, Founder, High Speed Analytics, to U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1110/s71110-86.htm.
264. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45782.
265. See Meyers & Khandros, supra note 244.
266. Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. at 45782.
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purpose other than surveillance and regulatory purposes.”267 In addition
to general language requiring the plan sponsor to adhere to certain data
confidentiality standards, Rule 613 contains specific ways the plan
sponsors must protect data.268 For example, Rule 613 requires the NMS
Plan sponsors adopt rules that “(1) require information barriers between
regulatory staff and non-regulatory staff with regard to access and use
of data in the central repository, and (2) permit only persons designated
by plan sponsors to have access to the data in the central repository.”269
Rule 613 prevents confidential information from being “communicated
to any personnel at an SRO that are engaged in non-regulatory or
business activities.”270 Some industry members feared that third parties,
including academia and individuals with fiduciary responsibility to
shareholders, would be granted access to the CAT data.271 Conversely,
other commentators maintain the benefits of granting third-party access,
such as third-party analysis, contributing to the effectiveness of the
SEC.272 The SEC, citing privacy concerns, however, refused to grant
third party access to CAT data.273 In sum, the SEC understands the
importance of confidentiality and included safeguards to inhibit leakage
of confidential information in the framework of Rule 613.274
B.

Financial Costs for Both SROs and Broker-Dealers
Necessitated by the NMS Plan

As required by Rule 613, the eighteen SROs and FINRA
submitted an NMS plan with detailed estimation of costs for both
broker-dealers and the SROs.275 The SROs and FINRA developed the
estimation via cost-related comments to the Rule 613 proposal,
information provided by the six short listed bidders, and surveys
distributed to broker dealers.276 The six short listed bidders provided

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 45782.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Joint NMS Plan Letter, supra note 32, at app. (C)(44).
Id.
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one-year cost estimates along with annual recurring costs. 277
1. Broker-Dealer Costs to Adhere to Rule 613
Approximately 50% of the 4,000 broker-dealers adhere to audit
trail reporting obligations.278 Only 167 broker dealers responded to the
survey, however, and only fifty-seven279 dealer-brokers disclosed
current reporting costs.280 Of the fifty-seven broker dealers, average
annual change in implementation and maintenance costs to comply with
CAT standards averaged approximately $346,000 for the twenty-four
large broker-dealers (broker dealers possessing more than $500,000 in
capital on a certain audit date) and $435,000 for thirty-three small
broker-dealers.281 For broker-dealers without current reporting costs,
cost estimations ranged between $0 and $20 million for one time
implementation costs, and between $50,000 and $6 million for annual
maintenance costs.282 In addition to reporting costs, one time hardware
and software costs to broker-dealers for implementation of the CAT
ranged from $13,200 to $5 million.283 Also, estimates for future
surveillance hardware and software costs ranged from $125,000 to $17
million per year.284
Broker-dealers costs, however, are somewhat misleading
because the NMS plan detailed that some, if not most, of the costs will
be passed on to investors.285 Regardless, even assuming the highest
averages for the 4,000 large and small broker-dealers, the total
expenditures do not near the $1 trillion value loss at the height of the
Flash Crash.286 Additionally, the costs associated with each brokerdealer is nominal relative to the SRO’s estimated costs.
277. Id.
278. Id. at app. (C)(44).
279. The fifty-seven used to estimate costs included fifty-one OATS reporters and six

other broker-dealers that report to a different system that reported positive current reporting
costs. Id. at app. (C)(54).
280. Id. at app. (C)(49).
281. Id. at app. (C)(54–55).
282. Id. at app. (C)(55).
283. Id. at app. (C)(56).
284. Id.
285. Id. at app. (C)(52).
286. Assuming the highest estimation of costs, a combined $28,000,000 in cost,
multiplied by 4,000 broker-dealers, plus $20,000,000, would equal $112,000,000,000. See
id.
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2. Costs to SROs for Implementing and Maintaining a CAT
The six shortlisted bidders provided an estimated total cost of
ownership to build, operate, and maintain the CAT.287 Each bidder
anticipates that the actual cost estimates to build and maintain the CAT
differ from the initial estimates.288 The bidders estimated “total onetime cost to build the CAT, including technology, operational,
administration, and any other material costs” ranging from $30 million
to $91 million with an average of $59 million.289 Additionally, the
bidders provided five-year annual recurring cost estimates following the
selection of the winning bidder and an estimate of annual peak-year
costs.290 The estimates for total five-year cost, for the first five years of
operation, approximately ranged from $130 million to $465 million
with an average five year cost of $225 million and an average annual
cost of $50 million.291 Peak-year cost estimates approximately ranged
from $27 million to $110 million with an average of $60 million.292
The bidders estimated costs are much lower than the SEC
estimated $4 billion one- time cost and $2 billion annual recurring cost
when it first proposed Rule 613.293 The substantially lower cost,
however, could be a by-product of Rule 613 not requiring real-time
reporting or unique customer IDs.294 Some industry members have
suggested that not requiring real-time reporting or unique customer IDs
will be to the detriment of the effectiveness of the CAT.295 While Rule
613 solved privacy concerns and the NMS plan detailed relatively
reasonable cost estimations, the CAT in its current iteration is not
effective or necessary.
VII. CONCLUSION
Five years later, the Flash Crash burns bright in investor’s
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at app. (C)(54).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAT Cost Estimates Vary, Sit Well Below 2010 Figure, supra note 28.
See Consolidated Audit Trail, 77 Fed. Reg. 45722, 45766 (August 1, 2012)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
295. Walter, supra note 211.
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minds.296 When almost a $1 trillion in market value dissipates in
minutes, action will be taken.297 As HFT continues to dominate the
market, regulators must develop effective regulatory methods.298 Rule
613 seeks to regulate the entire market landscape in order to prevent
extreme market volatility and increase transparency by having more
effective market surveillance.299 While the CAT helps to achieve these
goals, it leaves much on the table by not requiring real-time reporting or
unique customer IDs.300 On the other hand, from a privacy standpoint
Rule 613 took ample precaution in preventing misappropriation of
sensitive data.301 Furthermore, from a cost standpoint the CAT is
substantially less expensive than anticipated.302
Regardless, prior regulations limit the need for the CAT. For
example, the large trader reporting rule receives much of the same
information the CAT receives in the same time frame.303 Additionally,
the limit up-limit down mechanism and market wide circuit breakers
would have halted much of the trading during the Flash Crash.304
Combined, the regulations enacted prior to Rule 613 substantially limit
the possibility of another flash crash.305 In its current iteration, the CAT
is an overreaction to the danger of flash crashes.
HAYDEN C. HOLLIMAN
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